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Introduction
During the early years of Internet development, the National
Science Foundation (NSF) maintained an "Acceptable Use Policy"
which dictated a uniform code of conduct for users of the Internet.'
The purpose of the policy was to reserve the limited resources of the
Internet for legitimate official and academic uses. When the NSF
abdicated the role of controlling the use of the Internet to commercial
service providers in April 1995, Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
found the enforcement of a code of conduct left in their unprepared
hands. Not only had the use of the Internet expanded beyond the
original mandate, so too had the abuse of the Internet expanded in
new and unanticipated ways. The NSF's policy was not sufficiently
detailed to provide guidance to network operators who were bound by
the policy to enforce it. Furthermore, the NSF did not provide any
detailed illustrations regarding unacceptable uses. As a result, there is
currently no uniform acceptable use policy and no agreement between
ISPs and network operators regarding how to handle misuse and
abuse of the Internet.
As has been the case with most technology-based legal dilemmas,
the solution has not kept pace with the problem. The pace of
technological change is bewilderingly fast, and it is unlikely that the
law will be able to directly and quickly address issues that arise in
cyberspace. In the absence of a clear body of law, ISPs will have no
choice but to resort to self-help to keep the abuse and misuse of the
Internet in check.
This Article is intended to be a primer for lawyers who have to
deal with questions related to misuse and abuse of the Internet and
1. We dispense with a detailed discussion of the nature of the Internet, and how the
Internet of 1997 compares with the Internet of just a few years ago. For purposes of this Article,
a simple description of the Internet will suffice. The Internet is a network of connected computer
networks, interconnecting one to another for the purpose of facilitating the passing of
information in electronic format between users of information and providers of information. The
Internet supports a myriad of electronic services, including electronic messaging, Usenet News
(permitting users to simultaneously post messages to large numbers of other users on a wide
variety of topics), file transfer (using standard protocols, users can obtain electronic files from
specialized servers, including software and other interesting data), web browsing, electronic
shopping, and the like. In order to use the Internet, all that is needed by the average consumer is
an access device (generally, a computer, although specialized access "appliances" have recently
hit the market), a modem, a telephone line, an account with an ISP, and the desired software. For
a useful, albeit "legalistic," overview of the Internet, see ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D.
Pa.), prob. juris. noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
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who may be advising Internet Access Providers, Online Service
Providers, corporate Internet users, and private Internet consumers.2
Many of the issues discussed herein have not been finally resolved,
and some may very well defy resolution. So why bother to write a
primer now when the law, and the problems the law will have to
resolve, are not yet clear? There are several reasons:
Prevention of Regulation. It is our experience that whenever a
controversial problem is presented to the American public, and there
is an outcry for a legal solution to protect the interest of a diverse
population (common citizens, large corporations, educational
institutions, public interest institutions, and small business
enterprises), the legislative process rarely works well to address those
issues. Lawyers, judges, and lawmakers tend to lack an understanding
of emerging technologies, particularly the Internet, and how these new
technologies are changing the way people communicate and transact
business. The legislative process is one of negotiation, wherein
lawmakers attempt to satisfy all constituencies. The product of the
legislative process is commonly a hodgepodge of compromises that
rarely generate a comprehensive and common sense solution. If the
industry were to properly police itself today, the perceived need for
regulation could be substantially mitigated. If ISPs and Internet users
do not take responsibility for controlling abuses, the various state and
federal legislative bodies and regulatory agencies will attempt to do
the job for them. If the industry leaves the policing in the hands of
lawmakers and judges with limited Internet experience, traditional
legal principles will likely be imported to the new medium with
alarming consequences. ISPs and users could find themselves subject
to direct, contributory, or vicarious criminal or civil liability without
actual knowledge of the crime they have committed or the tort for
which they may be held liable.3 At the risk of sounding alarmist, it is
2. At one time there was a distinction to be made between an "Internet Access Provider"
and an "Online Service Provider." An Online Service Provider (OSP) offered a service which
permitted customers to access stored information over a communication medium such as a
telephone line, cable, or wireless network (including satellite, microwave, or mobile facilities)
and combined such access with the provision of electronic content. An Internet Access Provider
(IAP) offered a service that provided access to the Internet to customers, but the IAP did not
engage in the provision of electronic content. Both the IAP and the OSP may have offered a
suite of services, including electronic mail, but the substantial distinction was in regard to the
generation of proprietary content. The distinction between the two is largely blurred today, and
we use the term "ISP" to refer to both Online Service Providers and Internet Access Providers.
3. See generally Ian C. Ballon, Pinning the Blame in Cyberspace: Towards a Coherent
Theory for Imposing Vicarious Copyright, Trademark, and Tort Liability for Conduct Occurring
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possible that failure on the part of ISPs to act responsibly and on their
own may retard the development of the Internet.
Protection of Reputation. As will become more apparent later in
this Article, an ISP's reputation for tolerance of its subscribers'
Internet abuse is critical to its success in the market. ISPs and other
network operators have significant powers at their disposal to sanction
other ISPs who fail to take appropriate measures to detect, prevent,
and terminate Internet abuse. Not the least of these powers is the
ability to block traffic originating from an ISP whose service is being
used to harass or intimidate others on the Internet, or whose service is
used to attempt to breach network security or violate use policies and
group charters. In the absence of government action or other forms of
regulation, ISPs are not, and should not be, hesitant to impose
sanctions necessary to protect their own subscribers and their own
industry reputations. Having a reputation for fierce protection of
Internet consumers will prevent the ISP from losing respectable
paying customers and will discourage other unscrupulous and
unsavory users bent on mischief from using that particular ISP's
service to perpetrate their own nefarious deeds. A reputation for
diligence in preventing abuse can even be a market differentiator for
the ISP.
Avoiding Liability to Subscribers. While the extent of duty an ISP
may have to a subscriber is not clear, the ISP can substantially avoid
liability for its subscribers' misuse and abuse of the Internet. This can
be done through the adoption of an Acceptable Use Policy, a
consistent and good faith effort to enforce the policy, cooperation
within the industry to detect and prevent abuse, and clear contractual
language limiting the ISP's liability. To avoid liability, the ISP must
clearly and unequivocally articulate the standard of conduct expected
from its subscribers, and reserve the right, equally unequivocally, to
terminate service in the event the subscriber violates the Acceptable
Use Policy.
Over the Internet, 18 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 729 (1996). For example, some early drafts of the
Nil Copyright Protection Act of 1995 included provisions which sought to impose strict liability
for copyright infringement on online service providers whose systems were used to transmit or
store infringing works. See H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. (1995).
I
Historical Perspective on Acceptable Use
In response to the need for a separate network for educational
institutions, the National Science Foundation Network ("NSFnet")
created an Internet backbone in 1986, providing interconnection
between five super-computing centers throughout the United States.4
The academic community received the services of the NSFnet free of
charge. 5 To take advantage of this cost saving network service, a dozen
regional networks were formed to connect to NSFnet.6 Because the
primary purpose of the NSFnet was to support research and
educational activities, commercial uses of the NSFnet were forbidden
so as not to interfere with more traditional academic pursuits.
In managing the NSFnet and the National Science Foundation
articulated an Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) under the auspices of the
National Science Foundation Act of 1950.7 The Acceptable Use Policy
defined two unacceptable uses of the network: (1) "use in for-profit
activities unless covered by the General Principle or as a specifically
acceptable use" and (2) "[e]xtensive' use for private or personal
business."8 During the administration of NSFnet, several educational
institutions that connected to the network extended the NSF AUP to
users of their own networks in order to assure consistency across their
networks. Although commercial and private use of the NSFnet was
strictly forbidden, such use of the early Internet was largely ignored as
long as it did not interfere with the "official" use of the network.
Several ISPs offering service before the dismantling of NSFnet
used the federally funded network to carry data traffic. Several of
these Internet providers included the NSFnet Acceptable Use Policy
in their account "terms and conditions." Despite restrictions imposed
by the NSF, commercial use of the NSFnet was growing at an
estimated rate of 15-20% per month in 1990.9
4. Robert H'obbes' Zakon, Hobbes' Internet Timeline v.2.5 (visited Apr. 6, 1997)
<http://info.isoc.org/guest/zakon/Internet/History/HIT.html>.
5. KATIE HAFFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY Up LATE 245-46 (1996).
6. Regional networks included NYSERNET ("New York State Educational Research
Network") and CERFNET ("California Educational Research Network").
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1862(a)(4) (1994).
8. A 1992 version of the National Science Foundation Acceptable Use Policy is appended
infra in Appendix C. The document can also be found on the World Wide Web. (visited Apr. 21,
1997)<http://ds.internic.net:80/pub/netpolicy/nsfnet-aup.txt>(June 1992).
9. Michael Hauben, U.S. Government and Proposals on the NSF Backbone to the Internet,
AMATEUR COMPUTERIST (Summer/Fall 1993)<http://wuarchive.wustl.edu/doc/misc/acn/acn5-3.txt>.
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In the early 1990's, commercial providers began building their
own networks. Nationwide links built by MCI and Sprint eventually
led to the decommissioning of NSFnet in April 1995.10 To fill the gap
left by NSFnet's departure, associations such as The Commercial
Internet Exchange Association (CIX) were formed in 1991 as a trade
alliance open to all commercial Internet carriers. All members agreed
to exchange traffic at a fixed and equal cost set by the association."
While NSFnet catered to the research and academic community, the
CIX and its commercial backbone providers provided a means of
developing a public network that permitted the commercial use
prohibited by the NSFnet AUP.
II
What is Unacceptable Use?
In order to fully address the concept of acceptable use of the
services offered by ISPs, we will attempt to define some of the more
common abuses and misuses of the Internet. One attribute of the
subcultural technological revolution now sweeping the nation that
both amuses and confuses is the penchant for adoption of Internet
slang. We have long heard tales of "hacking" done by "hackers," but
only recently have we begun to hear about "spamming," "cracking,"
"spoofing," "flaming," "mail bombing," and "anonymous remailing."
These activities are generally prohibited by most network operators,
but not well understood by lawyers and lawmakers. Common language
descriptions exist for many of these activities, but the reader should be
aware that there are many derivatives of each of these activities. As
soon as the terms are understood a new variant is devised, or a whole
new class of deviant activity is created. As discussed later, this
"deviation factor" is an important part of our approach to contractual
enforcement of acceptable use principles.
The following are examples of unacceptable uses of the Internet
which ISP's should attempt to prohibit under the model this Article
proposes:
10. See Nicholas Baran, et al., The Greatest Show on Earth, BYrE, July, 1995, at 69.
11. Management and Operation of the NSFNET by the National Science Foundation, 1992
Hearings before the Subcomm. On Science, Space, and Technology, 102d Cong.
(1992)(statement of Mitchell Kapor, President, Electronic Frontier Foundation).
Spamming: To cause a newsgroup to be flooded with irrelevant
or inappropriate messages.' This is often done with cross-posting to
multiple Usenet newsgroups, or sending many identical or nearly-
identical messages separately to a large number of Usenet
newsgroups.Y
On April 12, 1994, two Arizona attorneys, Laurence Canter and
Marsha Siegel, posted an advertisement to over 6,000 Internet
newsgroups.14 The posting described a United States "Green Card
lottery," a chance for non-Americans to enter a very low-odds U.S.-
work-permit raffle. Canter and Siegel offered to fill in forms for a
mere $95 per person or $145 a couple (without mentioning that it was
free to enter). The posting of identical messages to several groups is
referred to as "cross-posting" as well as "spamming." Internet Direct,
Canter and Siegel's ISP, canceled its account after the deluge of
complaints from Internet users rendered Internet Direct's systems
inoperative. 5 In response to incidents like the one caused by Canter
and Siegel, Internet providers began adding provisions to their
account terms and conditions prohibiting the posting of commercial
advertisements to non-commercial Usenet groups.
Mail Bombing: To send, or urge others to send, massive amounts
of e-mail to a single system or person, with intent to crash the
recipient's system. Sometimes done in retaliation for a perceived
breach of "Netiquette.', 16 Mail bombing can take many forms, from
sending unreasonably large files attached to electronic mail (slowing
or stopping users' ability to retrieve mail), to sending multiple copies
of identical messages, or subscribing a victim to several Internet
mailing lists. In August 1996, more than a dozen journalists and public
12. The New Hacker's Dictionary (visited April 6, 1997)<http://www.ccil.org:80/jargon>. In
early 1993, several Internet users began playing an electronic form of the fantasy game
"Dungeons and Dragons." The multi-user dungeons or "MUDs" were played in the form of text-
based conversation or "chat." An individual who reiterated the same point several times in rapid
succession, for the purpose of domineering a play session, was referred to as a "Spammer." It is
believed that the choice of "spain" as the moniker for this activity is related to the British
comedy troupe, Monty Python's skit depicting several Viking characters singing the praise of
canned pork products. The chorus of their tribute repeats, "Spam, Spare, Spam, Spam .... "in
repetition, and is thought to closely resemble the abusive ramblings described above.
13. This term refers to USENET News, a TCP/IP based service that is synonymous with an
electronic bulletin board with over 20,000 different topic groups. Most newsgroups contain a
charter that describes the topic of the group and whether commercial postings are welcome.
14. K. K. Campbell, A Net Conspiracy So Immense (visited April 6, 1997)<http://www.eff.
org/pub/legal/cases/canter_.siegel>.
15. See infra text accompanying note 16.
16. The New Hacker's Dictionary, supra note 12.
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figures were the recipients of a mail bombing referred to as the "Great
Maelstrom."' 7 Victims were subscribed to over 1,000 Internet mailing
lists resulting in the receipt of several thousand unwanted pieces of e-
mail per day.'
8
Hacking/Cracking: The act of gaining unauthorized access to
another network, computer system, or files. Cracking refers
specifically to the act of breaking password protection on a network,
computer system, or files. In February 1995, the case of Kevin Mitnick
brought national attention to the underworld of hacking. FBI agents in
their early morning raid on Mitnick's apartment seized data files
containing over 20,000 credit card numbers stolen from computer
systems around the nation.' Mitnick was also accused of hacking into
computer systems at Apple Computers, Motorola, Inc., Netcom, The
Well, and Colorado SuperNet. As a child he gained national
attention with his break-in to the North American Air Defense System
(NORAD).21
Syn Flood Attacks: The sole purpose of a syn flood is to
overburden the intended victim's systems by sending a high volume of
spurious data, effectively slowing or shutting down those systems.' A
syn flood attack was launched on the New York Public Access
Networks Corporation (PANIX).1 The PANIX attacker was reported
to have sent over 200 false packets per second, rendering PANIX's
service inoperable for more than a week.Y
Forged/Spoofed Headers: Consumer Internet access accounts
generally allow users to send and receive electronic mail and post
articles to Usenet news. By altering e-mail and Newsreader software,
users can disguise their identity to achieve anonymity, or they can
assume the identity of another individual. For example, the Internet is
replete with stories of a jilted lover who assumes the identity of his
former girlfriend by altering a newsreader program. He then posts
illicit articles assuming her identity in hopes of damaging her
reputation. Forged headers are also a common method for attempting
to evade law enforcement. A user who traffics pirated software by
17. David W. Methvin, Mailbomb Maelstrom on the Net, WINDOWS MAG., Nov. 1996, at 44.
18. Id.
19. Tom Abate, How Cybersleuths Ensnared Hacker, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 16, 1995, at Al.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. The New Hacker's Dictionary, supra note 12.
23. Joshua Quittner, Panix Attack, TIME, Sept. 30, 1996, at 64.
24. Id.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
electronic mail is likely to attempt to hide his identity with a forged e-
mail address.
Flaming and Flamage: The act of emailing or posting material
designed to insult or provoke.' One of the first incidents of flaming
occured in the mid-1970s by an electronic mail discussion group called
the "Header People." 6 While at times "flame sessions" are at best
spirited discussions, an out of hand "flame war" can so dominate a
discussion group as to interfere with others' use and enjoyment of the
Internet.
"Bots": Automatic posting programs, or bots, originated as a
method to control Internet Relay Chat sessions (or live interactive
discussion groups).' The use of bots on IRC sessions is synonymous
with the use of spamming UseNet posts to dominate a discussion
group. Some Internet users have attempted to use bot technology to
further the fight against Internet abuse. "Cancelbots" can be used to
remove inappropriate postings to UseNet news, or used
inappropriately to cancel legitimate postings.
Anonymous Remailers: While not necessarily an Internet abuse,
there are several Internet sites that allow users to conduct transactions
with complete anonymity. These sites were initially developed to
provide secure public-private key encryption services. The anonymous
re-mailer strips an incoming message of all header information and
resends the message with an anonymous "from" line. Use of
anonymous remailers has hindered Internet abuse verification. Some
have theorized that remailers have allowed software pirates, drug
traffickers, illegal online gaming operations, and child pornographers
to conduct business without fear of detection.28
25. The New Hacker's Dictionary, supra note 12.
26. HAFFNER & LYON, supra note 5, at 215. The Header People discussion group was an
unofficial mailing list devoted to the design of electronic mail headers. According to one
participant, the discussions were so heated that "we normally wore asbestos underwear."
27. There are a variety of "bots" on the Internet today including Cancelbots, Chatterbots,
softbots, userbots, taskbots, knowbots, mailbots, warbots, clonebots, floofdbots, annoybots,
Vladbots, gossipbots, and spybots.
28. See Amy Harmon, Internet Figure Pulls Plug on His Anonymity Service
Technology: Supporters Say 'Remailer' Promoted Free Speech. Critics Blame It For Crime,
Pornography, L.A. TMEs, Aug. 31,1996, at Al.
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ISPs' Liability for Subscribers' Abuse of the Internet
From a liability perspective, the Internet is largely new ground.
Few decisions help to determine how traditional concepts and laws
will be applied in the online revolution. From what little law exists,
and in the absence of legislative solutions, it appears as if jurists will
attempt to apply "off-line" legal concepts to online torts, contracts,
intellectual property rights, and electronic commerce. Lawmakers are
in a quandary on how, and if, to regulate activity on the Internet.
Meanwhile, businesses and individuals are moving swiftly to transact
business and otherwise communicate over the Internet. It is safe to say
that the law in this area will change in many ways over the next few
years, but, for now, we are left to apply traditional rules to new
problems.
Generally speaking, an ISP is not liable for how subscribers use
the ISP's system unless it can be held directly, contributively, or
vicariously liable. As a general rule, the existing case law drawn from
cases involving defamation, copyright, and free speech claims suggest
that an ISP may only be held responsible for the conduct of its
subscribers where the ISP knew or should have known that its system
was being used to damage others or to violate the law.
A. Defamation
Under the principles articulated in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe,
Inc.,29 an ISP which does not adopt the role of publisher or assume
responsibility for monitoring its subscribers' postings is not liable for
the statements of its users. In Cubby, a gossip database called
"Skuttlebut" sued Compuserve and the publisher of a competing daily
electronic newsletter available to Compuserve's subscribers.
30
Skuttlebut alleged that defendants published false and defamatory
statements about Skuttlebut and its publisher.' Plaintiffs asserted that
Compuserve should be held liable for statements loaded into the
company's computer banks by an independent third party.' The court
held that Compuserve took on the role of a "distributor" of
information and could not be held liable absent a showing that it knew
29. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).




or should have known of the defamation. A distributor is not
required to be aware of everything contained in its electronic
databases or which transits its electronic network.3 According to the
court in Cubby:
A computer database is the functional equivalent of a more
traditional news vendor, and the inconsistent application of a lower
standard of liability . . . would impose an undue burden on the
free flow of information. Given the relevant First Amendment
considerations, the appropriate standard of liability to be
applied . . . is whether it knew or had reason to know of the
allegedly defamatory . . . statements.Y
In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,3 a New York
court reached a similar conclusion. Plaintiff Stratton Oakmont sued
Prodigy, and the "discussion leader" on Prodigy's "Money Talk"
computer bulletin board, Charles Epstein.' Plaintiffs alleged libel per
se for statements posted to the bulletin board to the effect that the
plaintiffs committed criminal and fraudulent acts in connection with
an initial public offering of stock.8 As the discussion leader, Epstein
served in the capacity of a moderator, and had the opportunity to
prevent the posting of the offensive message.' The court held that
Epstein was an agent of Prodigy, and that Prodigy was the publisher of
the offensive message because it exercised sufficient editorial control
over the content of its bulletin board that it could be held liable for the
statements.?
B. Copyright Infringement
Even in the intellectual property and copyright context, ISPs are
not necessarily vicariously liable for unauthorized copies of
copyrighted work that were made and stored on its computers. The
most recent case on the subject is Religious Technology Center v.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 141.
35. Id. at 140-41.
36. 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995),rehg denied, 1995 WL 805178 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Dec. 11, 1995).
37. Id. at "1.
38. Id.
39. Id. at *3.
40. Id. at *6-*7. Interestingly, it appears that Prodigy's conscious choice to gain the benefit
of editorial control opened it up to greater liability than other networks who simply let
subscribers post what ever they want, at least until someone complains. This suggests that ISPs
may very well be obligated to take action once they know their network is being used in a
tortious manner, or face the consequences for doing nothing.
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Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.41 In February 1995, the
Church of Scientology sued an ex-minister for infringement of the
Church's copyrights by allegedly posting more than 100 pages of secret
church material to the InternetY The ex-minister's bulletin board
service (BBS) and its ISP, Netcom, were accused of strict liability
copyright infringement.43 The court held that "although copyright is a
strict liability statute, there should be some element of volition or
causation which is lacking where a defendant's system is merely used
to create a copy by a third party.'" ' The court went on to say "it does
not make sense to adopt a rule that could lead to the liability of
countless parties whose role in the infringement is nothing more than
setting up and operating a system that is necessary for the functioning
of the Internet."'  The court left standing a cause of action for
contributory infringement to permit liability if the planitffs could show
that Netcom's management was (1) aware of the posting, and (2) knew
it to be infringing. 6
In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA,1 the court held that the
defendant's acts were more participatory than those of the defendant
in Netcom. MAPHIA was an electronic bulletin board operator who
offered storage capacity on its equipment for subscribers. s Acting on
an anonymous tip, Sega collected evidence that MAPHIA was
operating its BBS to collect and distribute pirated video game
software.' The court held that MAPHIA had knowledge of direct
infringement of Sega's copyrights by its members and actually
encouraged the activity so as to be held liable under the theory of
contributory infringement.50
The distinction between the Netcom and Sega cases turns on (1)
the transient nature of the storage in Netcom, where the ISP "acts
more like a conduit," keeping an archive of files for no more than a
41. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
42. Id. at 1365-66.
43. Id at 1370.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1372.
46. Id at 1381. See also Ballon, supra note 3, at 766-70 (discussing the subsequent settle-
ment of the Netcom case).
47. 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
48. Id. at 927.
49. 1d
50. 1d at 933. See also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). In
Playboy, a bulletin board operator was held liable for copyright infringement for allowing
subscribers to download plaintiff's copyrighted photographs from the defendant's bulletin board.
short duration,' and (2) the knowledge and encouragement of the
infringing activity by the system operator. This case law strongly
suggests that ISPs must establish a practice of taking action when they
have notice of offensive activity taking place on their service,
particularly where the ISP's involvement is more than acting merely as
a conduit for the offending activity.5
C. Free Speech
The courts have recently addressed the issue of whether the
refusal of an ISP to allow a user to send unsolicited e-mail
advertisements over the Internet would amount to an infringement of
free speech under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. In Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc.,9 the
plaintiff was an advertising agency that provided "advertising services
for companies and individuals wishing to advertise their products and
service via e-mail.'"' AOL received numerous complaints from
disgruntled subscribers and became upset with the plaintiff's delivery
of unsolicited email to AOL subscribers over the Internet.5 AOL
subsequently sent a number of "e-mail bombs" by gathering all
unsolicited e-mail messages sent to undeliverable AOL addresses in a
bulk transmission to the plaintiff's ISPs.1 The plaintiff filed suit
against AOL, alleging that because of AOL's e-mail bombings two of
the plaintiffs ISPs terminated their relations with it, and a third ISP
refused to provide the plaintiff with service.' In its first amended
complaint, the plaintiff sought a declaration that it had the right to
send unsolicited e-mail advertisements to AOL members via the
Internet.' The district court concluded that the plaintiff did not have
the right to send unsolicited e-mail to AOL members and that AOL,
as a private company, may block any attempts by the plaintiff to do
51. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372.
52. Note that the WIPO Copyright Treaty adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on
December 20, 1996 creates an express exemption from copyright infringement liability where the
service provider acts merely as "conduit" in the distribution of an infringing work. See WIPO
Copyright Treaty (Dec. 23, 1996)<http://www.wipo.orgleng/diplconf/distrib/95dc.htm>.
53. 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
54. Id. at 439.
55. Id. at 438.
'56. Id. at 437.
57. Id.
58. The plaintiff asserted violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1030 (1994), as well as state commercial tort claims. AOL filed a counter suit seeking injunctive
relief and damages. Id. at 437-38.
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so.Y AOL was held not to be a "state actor" under the three tests for
state action enunciated by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.60 As a private company, AOL was free to prevent the
undesirable activity by any means at its disposal.
D. Lessons Learned
It is admittedly difficult to draw a cohesive set of rules from
disparate legal disciplines that will fit any set of circumstances, but that
is often precisely what clients ask their lawyers to do. At the risk of
oversimplifying complex legal theories, here are the essential lessons
from the meager case law available today.
Based on Cyber Promotions, a privately owned ISP is well within
its rights to exercise control over information posted in public places
within the ISP's services or sent via the Internet to the ISP's
subscriber. The ISP may take whatever reasonable action it deems
necessary to protect itself and its subscribers from abuse. Meanwhile,
the lesson from Cubby and Prodigy is that knowledge of the offending
conduct, together with the opportunity to prevent or curtail such
conduct, could very well give rise to a duty to act. Finally, Netcom and
Sega suggest that contributory liability could attach merely from the
knowledge of an offending act. This makes for a compelling argument
that the ISP should take measures to protect itself and its subscribers
by limiting the manner in which its service may be used by both
subscribers and outsiders.
But how invasive should such protective measures' be? This
Article does not suggest that the ISP must take extraordinary
measures to detect and prevent misuse. Indeed, an ISP is prohibited
from engaging in some very invasive actions, such as monitoring e-
mail traffic, under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA).61 Once a message is posted in a public place accessible by
other subscribers or the offending message is sent to another
subscriber who complains about the posting, however, the ISP is not
59. I. at 445-46.
60. Id at 445. The three "state actor" tests were taken from Mark v. Borough of Hatboro,
51 F.3d 1137 (3d Cir. 1995). The first test is the "exclusive public function" test, wherein the
inquiry is whether "the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the state." Id. at 1142. The second test is whether "the private party has acted with
the help of or in concert with state officials." Id. The third test is whether "[tihe state has so far
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with . . . [the acting party] that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity." Id.
61. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701,2702 (1994).
prohibited from reviewing the posted material. Any expectation of
privacy held by the user who posted the offending message is nullified
by the posting of the message for review by others.
Because it is still not certain that an ISP will be held liable to its
subscribers, to other ISPs, or to unrelated third parties for misuse and
abuse of the Internet, why bother to take on the onerous task of
adopting and enforcing an Acceptable Use Policy? The answer is
simple. If the ISP does not accept responsibility to resolve disputes,
responsibility will nonetheless be thrust upon it by other members of
the Internet community. It will not suffice for the ISP to ignore
disputes no matter how painful dispute resolution might be. ISPs
which shun their duties to the community will suffer the ultimate
punishment of a networked community: isolation. This means the
offending ISP could easily find its subscribers' access to the resources
of the global Internet blocked. Without access to the global Internet,
an ISP has little or no chance of survival in the Internet access market.
IV
Enforcement Scheme
Generally speaking, there are three components to the
enforcement scheme proposed in this Article. All three components
serve the purpose of resolving issues of abuse or misuse of the
Internet. These components, if properly implemented, can be
successfully utilized by any ISP to prevent unacceptable use of the
Internet:
(1) Contractual Use Limitations: An ISP should include in its
service agreements with customers, resellers, and sales agents a set of
express "Use Limitations" that generally describes conduct which the
ISP intends to preclude;
(2) Acceptable Use Policy. An ISP should adopt a standard set of
guidelines applicable to all subscribers, which we refer to as an
"Acceptable Use Policy" or "Policy," and which provides examples of
conduct, based on actual or known incidents, that constitute violations
of the Contractual Use Limitations; and
(3) Practices and Procedures: An ISP should implement practices
and procedures which assure swift identification of problems as they
arise, and which promote consistent and certain application of the
Policy and Use Limitations.
The success or failure of the ISP in enforcing the Policy and Use
Limitations depends on the ISP taking an active, if not proactive, role
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with respect to quickly identifying policy violations, investigating such
violations with tenacity and professionalism, and taking immediate
and decisive action. An ISP which ignores its Policy; Use Limitations,
and practices and procedures, or who enforces them in an arbitrary
and inconsistent manner, will most likely not be successful in
defending itself from breach of contract claims arising from
disciplinary action taken against subscribers who violate the
Contractual Use Limitations.
The Policy should be maintained separately from the Contractual
Use Limitations for several reasons. The Contractual Use Limitations
document the intent of the parties to prohibit certain activities based
on the implications to the ISP and the subscriber. As a general
expression of intent, the Use Limitations provide the ISP with greater
flexibility in addressing specific conduct which may not have been
anticipated or possible at the time the service agreement between the
ISP and the subscriber was executed, but which nonetheless
constitutes a clear breach of the acceptable standard of conduct. The
Policy, on the other hand, is a more specific identification of conduct
which is known at any particular moment in time to be a violation of
the Use Limitations in the service agreement. The Policy is a living
and evolving document that contains illustrations and examples of
conduct unacceptable to the ISP. The Policy illustrates for the
subscriber the types of conduct considered a violation of the
Contractual Use Limitations, subjecting the subscriber to disciplinary
action. As the industry is in its early stages of development, so too are
those who are bent on using the Internet to commit acts of mischief or
abuse. Contracts that merely prohibit specific examples of prohibited
conduct will quickly be out of date as abusers devise new and creative
ways to carry out their mischief. An ISP does not want to amend its
subscriber contract, and go through the effort of obtaining subscriber
approval of a new revised agreement, every time a new form of abuse
is attempted somewhere in the industry. While the service agreement
is usually executed at the time the subscriber establishes service, the
Policy can be posted at a conspicuous and easily reached location on
the ISP's web site or can be delivered periodically to the subscriber via
e-mail or other medium.
62
62. ISPs generally use "click to accept" service agreements which the user is required to
execute electronically prior to gaining access to the ISP's service. A "click to accept" agreement
is commonly used with software licenses as well. The agreement is presented to the user in the
form of a dialogue box displayed before the user installs or launches software, or before the user




The Contractual Use Limitations' terms should contain, at a
minimum, terms that put the subscriber on notice as to the types of
activities that may result in disciplinary action. Model Contractual Use
Limitation language is included in Appendix A.
A. Compliance with Rules, Regulations, and Polcies
63
First, the Use Limitations should place the subscribers on notice
that they are obligated to honor the rules, regulations, and policies of
any Internet service or resource that they may access in the course of
using the ISP's service. It is not the ISP's responsibility to republish
every rule that may apply when the subscriber accesses a third party's
service. It is incumbent on the subscriber to know the rules that apply
in cyberspace. Similar to the duties imposed on individuals in their
family life and countries in international diplomacy, it is the ISP's duty
to uphold reasonable rules of its Internet neighbors. In this way, the
ISP can reasonably expect other ISPs to respect its rules and
regulations. Secondly, the ISP should place the subscriber on notice
that such rules, regulations, and policies may be amended from time to
time. The old adage that "ignorance of the law is no excuse" is alive
and well in the electronic community. Thirdly, the ISP should reserve
the right to take any form of disciplinary action appropriate to the
infraction. The disciplinary action should be commensurate with
violation; however, by reserving the right to terminate, the ISP has
absolute flexibility to prevent further violations.
and conditions presented in the dialogue box before being permitted to use the software or
service. The text of the agreement is presented in scrolling format, and the subscriber must click
on an "I Accept" button before the software can be used. If the potential subscriber clicks on the
"Cancel" or "I Do Not Accept" button, the software is disabled or the attempt to set up an
online session is terminated. Such agreements should be enforceable. Under UCC section 2-204,
a contract for the sale of goods is "made in any manner sufficient to show agreement," and under
UCC section 2-206, an offer can be accepted "in any reasonable manner." In ProCD v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 2014 (7th Cir. 1996), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that a shrinkwrap license agreement for software was binding on the buyer under the
UCC. For a discussion of online contractual issues, See Fred M. Greguras, et al., Electronic
Commerce: Online Contract Issues, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, PATENTS, COPYRIGHT,
TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, 452 PLI/PAT. 11 (Sept. 1996).
63. See Appendix A infra Part L.A.
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B. Prohibited Activities
64
The ISP should reserve the right to take any and all action
necessary to preserve the integrity of its service, up to and including
termination of the subscriber's service. The reservation of rights
should protect the ISP's right to take action on the first or any
subsequent occurrence of prohibited activities.
The subscriber should be prohibited from using the ISP's service
in a manner that violates the law.65 While it is impossible to list each
and every law the subscriber may violate, some of the more common
violations relate to criminal statutes, intellectual property laws,
international treaties, content-based regulations (i.e., obscenity), and
public utility tariffs.
The subscriber should also be placed on notice that use of the
ISP's service in a manner that is defamatory, fraudulent, indecent,
offensive, or deceptive, while not necessarily criminal, is prohibited.'
For example, use of the service to publish false statements about
another subscriber may force the ISP to mediate a dispute between
subscribers. The ISP need not worry that disciplinary action violates
free speech because, under the principles suggested by Cyber
Promotions, the ISP's action as a private company is not state action
that would subject the ISP to liability under the First Amendment.
67
Failure to take swift and decisive action in such cases will invite
retaliation and may lead the dispute into full-fledged civil litigation.
Recently, people have become concerned that the Internet is
becoming a haven for stalkers, child molesters, and pornographers.
The extent to which this is a real concern is open to discussion. 6 These
cases largely involve conflicting and confusing circumstances, and
often involve subscribers who, through fear or anger, tend toward
hysteria. The Use Limitations should include a prohibition against use
of the service in a manner intended to threaten, harass, abuse, or
64. See Appendix A infra Part 1.B.
65. See Appendix A infra Part 1.B(i).
66. See Appendix A infra Part 1.B(ii).
67. Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 441-42 (E.D. Pa.
1996).
68. The case of "Filmguy" is one incident fueling the debate. Robert Jay Tashbook, using
the online name "Fihnguy," was charged under a federal law aimed at sexual predators who use
the Internet to seek their prey. Tashbook was charged with traveling to Texas to molest a 15-year
old girl he met over the Internet. John Wildermuth, Bay Man Charged in Internet Sex Case, S.F.
CHRON., May 17, 1996, at A21. See also Nina Bernstein, On Frontier of Cyberspace, Data is
Money, and Threat, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1997, at Al (describing use of prison inmates to enter
personal data, which has led to at least one case of cyber-stalking).
intimidate othersP The ISP should also investigate all such incidents
carefully, and should be sensitive to the concerns of parents of young
subscribers. Nonetheless, measures can be taken to prohibit and
prevent such activities.
As we mentioned earlier, the ISP should zealously guard its
reputation. This may require that the ISP maintain some distance from
its subscribers' use of the Internet that casts the ISP in an unfavorable
light. In a market as competitive as the Internet Service market, a
decline in an ISP's reputation could easily translate into a
corresponding decline in market share and revenue. The Use
Limitations should include a catch-all provision that prohibits use of
the service in a manner that tends to damage the name or reputation
of the ISP.7 Again, this is a "facts and circumstances" call and the ISP
should utilize this use restriction only when it is facing the very real
threat of damage to its reputation.
The market for consumer Internet Access is based on the concept
that individual consumers can share common resources and thereby
reduce their individual costs of obtaining access to the Internet. The
ISP obtains high capacity communications resources which are then
used by subscribers on an as-needed basis. The ISP's resources are
necessarily limited in order to control costs, and the ISP manages
these resources in anticipation that sufficient resources will be
available to all those subscribers who need them at a particular time.
The ISP needs to ensure that every customer has access to all the
resources which were promised, but there are occasions when a
subscriber's access to the Internet may be blocked by another
subscriber's use or abuse of the service. Such is the case with
spamming incidents, where the news servers do not have sufficient
capacity to process all incoming messages at the same time. The result
is that other subscribers may be unable to access their email.
Therefore, it is also recommended that the Use Limitation include a
prohibition against use of the service in a manner that interferes with
other customers' use and enjoyment of the services provided by the
company.7'
69. See Appendix A infra Part 1.B(iii).
70. See id. Part 1.B.(iv).
71. See Appendix A infra Part 1.B(v).
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C. Computer and Network Security
72
Despite recent glamorization in the movies and in the popular
press, the problem of computer hacking has been around as long as
there have been computers and computer networks. Hacking is rarely
the product of clever young computer hackers who enter networks
using "back doors"13 and devious programming skills. Most hacking is
the product of system administrators and users who carelessly choose
passwords, who leave passwords lying around where they can be
found, and/or who forget or are too lazy to change passwords. Hacking
may not even involve breaking into a computer system, but rather may
be the result of lending a friend one's computer or password.
The subscriber shares in the obligation to protect his or her
account from access by unauthorized persons. For this reason, two use
restrictions should be imposed. First, subscribers should be precluded
from attempting to break security of the ISP's or a third party's
network, or to access an account which does not belong to them.
Second, subscribers should acknowledge their obligation to safeguard
their accounts against unauthorized access. This is to protect both the
subscriber and the ISP since such unauthorized use of the service is
difficult to detect. In order to maintain a reputation for reliability and
integrity, an ISP which suspects that their system or an individual
account has been compromised should take immediate action to
prevent further intrusions.
D. Setting the Expectation of Privacy
Setting the subscriber's expectations regarding the privacy of
communications is an important measure necessary for the protection
of the ISP, but it also reminds the subscriber that he or she should be
cautious with respect to electronic communications. It is the nature of
the medium that subscribers may easily and instantly share
communications they receive. If the subscriber is aware that his
messages may be published, he can tailor his message to make sure it
is suitable for a larger audience. Unless there is an express agreement
between the sender and the recipient of electronic messages, the
subscriber should expect that the recipient will share the message with
72. See idU Part 1.C.
73. A "back door" is a means of entering an otherwise secure computer system by way of a
special access program left on the computer system by the programmer or system manager.
others.74 The proposed Use Limitation also serves to remind the user
that the ISP has no control over distribution or publication of
messages received, other than the ability to deliver the message to the
original addressee.
75
The issue of anonymity on the Internet is the subject of
substantial debate.76 Many consumers will use the Internet to obtain
information because there is a perception of anonymity that is
inherent in the way information is exchanged in an electronic format.
To a large extent, that perception of anonymity is illusory because ISP
and Internet-based information providers must have at least basic
routing information in order to provide the information to the user
requesting it.77 However it is possible to provide real anonymity when
using the Internet, and there are existing businesses, commonly
referred to as anonymous remailers, which offer anonymity as a
service. Permitting subscribers to use their Internet access accounts to
achieve complete anonymity should be disfavored. While it may seem
appropriate, or even desirable at times, to permit anonymity to
encourage free speech and to enhance the online experience,
subscribers should not be permitted to use the ISP's service to avoid
accountability for their actions. Again, in the interest of assuring that
the subscriber is given notice of what is expected of them, the ISP may
consider adding language to the Contractual Use Limitations making
74. It is a fundamental rule of "netiquette," however, that a user should not send any
message which would cause embarrassment if read by her mother, child, spouse, boss, or the
press.
75. See Appendix A infra Part 1.D.
76. For a fascinating discussion of anonymity and accountability in cyberspace, see Anne
Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First
Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1639 (1995).
77. It is more than theoretically possible to trace an individual subscriber's request for
information from a particular site on the World Wide Web. At the risk of over simplifying the
complexity of Internet routing, here is a non-engineering description of how web surfing works.
When a subscriber dials into his or her ISP, the ISP assigns an "IP Address" to the subscriber for
the duration of the session. The ISP keeps a record of the time and date the subscriber has dialed
in, and records the IP Address. The subscriber then decides to "surf the web," and selects a web
site (or "web page") from which to obtain information. In order for the selected web page to be
displayed on a subscriber's computer, the web computer (called a "web server") must know
where to send the web page. By selecting a site on the web, the subscriber is actually directing
her computer to request a computer file stored on a distant web server and is providing her IP
Address for the returning file. The distant web server then sends the file over the Internet to the
IP Address of the subscriber. If the distant web server records the time, date, and IP Address to
which the web page was sent, that information can be matched to the time, date, IP Address, and
user identification maintained by the ISP.
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clear that a subscriber has no right to anonymity in his or her use of
the ISP's service.'
Likewise, an ISP should manage its business so as to be
accountable, at least to a limited extent, for the conduct of its
subscribers. That is not to say that the ISP should assume
responsibility for its subscriber's deeds, but rather they should be
prepared to assist in the enforcement of the laws by maintaining good
records of their subscribers' use of the Internet. The ISP should put
the subscriber on notice that it will cooperate with law enforcement
officials in the investigation of complaints and that account
information and other records will be provided to a law enforcement
agency in response to lawful process or as necessary to protect the
ISPs interests. 9 This notice reinforces with the subscriber that the
service may not be used in a manner which violates the law, and that
he or she will not be permitted to hide behind the ISP in the
commission of illegal acts.8 While some may feel this language will
frighten away potential subscribers, it may actually provide
reassurance to others who may fear that they will somehow be
victimized over the Internet. There is a tension here, but the
protection of good citizens and of the ISP's rights and reputation
outweigh the concerns that Big Brother may, in fact, be watching.
The ISP should also put the subscriber on notice that his use of
the service could subject him to jurisdiction outside his own county or
state of residence. Because of the lack of geographic boundaries for
any electronic interactions, the subscriber may unwittingly expose
himself to liability for conduct which may be perfectly acceptable at
home, but unlawful abroad. A broad notification should be sufficient
to put the subscriber on constructive notice of his duty to take care so
as not to break the laws of another jurisdiction. 8
78. See Appendix A infra note following Part 1.D.
79. Under section 2702 of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), an entity
providing remote computing service may divulge the contents of a communication to a law
enforcement agency if such contents appear to pertain to the commission of a crime. 18 U.S.C. §
2702(b)(6) (1994). An ISP may also divulge contents of a communication as may be necessarily
incident to the protection of the rights or property of the ISP. Id. § 2702(b)(5).
80. See Appendix A infra Part .E.
81. See Appendix A infra Part 1.F
VI
Acceptable Use Policy
As mentioned earlier, the Policy serves to illustrate to the
subscriber, by example, the types of conduct which will be considered
violations of the Contractual Use Limitations and will subject the
subscriber to disciplinary action. The Policy should provide examples
and illustrations of prohibited conduct known to the ISP at any
moment in time. It should tie back to the Contractual Use Limitation;
that is, it should serve to reinforce the contract principles involved,
and it should also emphasize that the listed activities are not all
inclusive. The Policy serves as a guideline only, and because it is an
evolving document which can be modified quickly and easily, it is
flexible enough to put the subscriber on notice that likely derivatives
of previously prohibited activities will themselves be prohibited. An
example of an Acceptable Use Policy appears at Appendix B.
VII
Practices and Procedures
The ISP should have in place practices and procedures for
detection and identification of unacceptable uses of their services. We
will not attempt to write a standard methods of operation binder here,
but we do suggest that an ISP establish its methods of operation with
the following components:
* Detection and Identification-The best way to enhance a
reputation for integrity would be to detect and identify abusive
activities in their early stages. Early detection will go a long way to
avoid having to deal with subscriber complaints, and will discourage
subscribers from attempting to use the ISP's service to conduct
themselves in nefarious ways. The ISP should have the necessary tools
available to personnel charged with Policy enforcement and
investigation of complaints, and make sure that they are well trained.
o Be a Good Neighbor-It is a good practice for the ISP to
communicate with other ISPs with regard to their experiences with
new forms of Internet Abuse. The best way to be prepared for abuses
is to hear about them from other ISPs and protect against them before
they happen to you.
o Complaint Procedures-The ISP should have a simple and
efficient complaint resolution procedure. It should investigate
complaints quickly, and report back to the complainant on the
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progress of the investigation and the ultimate disposition. If there has
been a violation of criminal laws, the ISP should be prepared to
cooperate with the complainant to forward the incident to law
enforcement officials.
9 Take Decisive and Consistent Action-The ISP should not
equivocate as to whether particular conduct is a violation of the Use
Limitations or of the Policy. The ISP should be consistent with regard
to enforcement, and be sure that the "punishment befits the crime." If
a subscriber's activity is putting another subscriber in harms way, act
with immediate dispatch.
e Keep Excellent Records-The ISP should keep very detailed
records in two regards. First, good system usage records help ensure
that individual subscribers can be held accountable for their actions.
Second, an ISP should keep good records regarding the investigation
of complaints. You never know when you might be called to testify in
a criminal or civil proceeding.
. Cooperate with Law Enforcement and Other ISPs-It is
critically important if the industry is to successfully police itself, and
thereby avoid regulation, that every ISP cooperate in properly
conducted investigations by other ISPs and law enforcement officials.
Once process has been satisfied, the ISP should do everything in its
power to assist in the investigation. Stopping abuse of the Internet,
even if it is not on the ISP's network, is in every ISP's interest.
* Provide Due Process-While not required by a privately-owned
ISP, it is recommended that a subscriber who is being punished for
violation of the Policy have the opportunity to appeal to someone with
higher authority. There need not be rules of evidence or an adversarial
hearing, but there should be someone with higher authority than the
investigating personnel to hear the subscribeis side of the story and
who will have the final word.
e Communicate Policy-Finally, the ISP should update its Policy
document as frequently as necessary, and subscribers should be
reminded to review the Policy periodically. Other means of
dissemination include placing Policy information in newsletters, on the
ISP's web page, and in billing enclosures.
VIII
Conclusion
Acceptable use of the Internet is an area in which the law can
reasonably be expected to evolve over the next few years.
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Undoubtedly, lawmakers will attempt to regulate certain aspects of
the New Online Frontier, and their attempts may or may not hit their
marks. Judges and juries will wrestle with novel legal concepts,
applying the law by allegory and analogy, and will perhaps strain
traditional legal principles to fit the digital revolution. However, until
there is greater clarity, ISPs are on their own, collectively and
individually, to find solutions to the problems of misuse and abuse of
the Internet. We believe the approach we have articulated here will
assist lawyers in helping their clients make informed decisions
regarding how to control aberrant behavior on the Internet, while at
the same time protecting their clients' interests.
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Appendix A:
Model Contractual Use Limitation Provisions
1. Use Limitations.
A. You agree to comply with the rules, regulations and policies
applicable to any network, server, computer database, web site,
newsgroup or ISP that you access through the Service. Any violation
of such rules, regulations and policies, or the violation of the
Acceptable Use Policy issued by the Company, as they may be
amended from time to time, shall be cause for the Company to
suspend or terminate your service.
B. The Company reserves the right, with or without notice, to
suspend or terminate the service provided to you under this
agreement, or to suspend, delete, or terminate any userlD, electronic
mail address, data file, IP address, Universal Resource Locator or
domain name used by you, upon the first or subsequent occurrence of
any of the following events:
(i) the service is used in a manner which constitutes violation of
any tariff, regulation, treaty or law (including, without limitation,
copyright, privacy, criminal, and international laws);
(ii) the service is used in a manner which is defamatory,
fraudulent, indecent, offensive, or deceptive;
(iii) the service is used in a manner which is intended to threaten,
harass, abuse, or intimidate others, or which is intended to violate the
privacy or property rights of others;
(iv) the service is used in a manner which tends to damage the
name or reputation of the Company, its parent, affiliates, and
subsidiaries; or
(v) the service is used in a manner which interferes with other
customers' use and enjoyment of the services provided by the
Company.
C. You understand and agree that any attempt to breach the
security of any computer network, or to access an account which does
not belong to you, shall be considered a material breach of this
Agreement, and such breach may result in suspension or termination
of the Service. You further agree to immediately notify the Company
of (i) any unauthorized use of your account and/or (ii) any breach, or
attempted breach, of security known to you.
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D. You understand that messages or documents sent by you are
private only to the extent that they are not published for viewing by
third persons. Private messages disclosed to third persons who chose
to publish them for viewing by third persons are no longer private.
Note: The ISP may consider adding a statement that subscribers
have no right to anonymity: "You further understand that you have no
right to send messages anonymously in the event that the messages
constitute prohibited activities pursuant to paragraph 1.B."
E. The Company will cooperate with law enforcement officials in
the investigation of complaints that your use of the service violates the
law. Your account information and other records will be provided to a
law enforcement agency only in response to lawful process.
F. You are responsible for the contents of any information that
you transmit or acquire through your use of the Service. You should
be aware that you may be subject to the laws of any jurisdiction to
which you transmit, or from which you receive, information. You are
solely responsible for obtaining current information on any laws which
may apply, including, but not limited to, copyright, trademark, and
patent laws.
G. Nothing contained in this Agreement may be construed to
convey to you any interest, title, or license in the userID, electronic
mail address, IP address, Universal Resource Locator, or domain
name used by you in connection with the Service.
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This document will be updated frequently. Please make a habit of
reviewing it from time to time to stay abreast of acceptable uses of the
Service.
Internet Access Use Policy
Your Internet access account allows you to access global
networks through the World Wide Web, electronic mail, FTP (File
Transfer Protocol), and the USENET. Your use of these services is
subject to the Terms and Conditions of the Service Agreement you
accepted at the time of registration for your Internet access account.
This Policy is intended to provide you with a set of guidelines you
must follow in your use of your account. Violations of this Policy, and
therefore the Service Agreement, may result in disciplinary action, up
to and including termination of your account.
In general, remember that you may not use your account:
e in a manner which violates rules, regulations and policies
applicable to any network, server, computer database, web site or ISP
that you access through the Service;
" in a manner which violates any law, regulation, treaty or tariff;
" in a manner which is defamatory, fraudulent, indecent,
offensive, or deceptive;
" to threaten, harass, abuse, or intimidate others;
" to damage the name or reputation of the Company, its parent,
affiliates, and subsidiaries;
o in a manner which interferes with other customers' use and
enjoyment of the services provided by the Company;
o to break security on any computer network, or to access an
account which does not belong to you.
The following is a list of guidelines for using your Internet




Your Internet access account gives you access to thousands of
USENET news groups. These USENET groups allow you to read and
post articles on a variety of topics. USENET groups may be
moderated or unmoderated. Groups may also have a charter that
describes what posts are appropriate.
Posting commercial messages to a USENET group is a violation
of this policy unless that specific USENET group has invited
commercial postings in its charter. If you are unable to find a group's
charter, or the charter does not address commercial postings, you must
assume that commercial postings to that group are not welcome.
Posting off-topic articles or articles that are not related to that
group's subject matter as defined in the newsgroup's charter is also not
welcomed. Cross-posting identical postings to over five USENET
groups, posting for the purpose of threatening, harassing, or
intimidating USENET group users, and forging USENET post header
information are also prohibited activities.
The Company does not censor or control the content posted to a
USENET group. As a user of our service, you are solely responsible
for the content that you publish. Upon notification that certain
postings violate this policy, violate the law, or infringe on a Trademark
or a Copyright of another, the Company may, at its discretion, remove
offending posts from its news server.
Secure Password
Your password provides access to your individual account. It is
your responsibility to keep your password secure. Sharing your
password and account access with others is prohibited. Attempting to
obtain another user's account password is strictly prohibited.
Electronic Mail
Your Internet access account includes the ability to send and
receive electronic mail. Use of your electronic mail account to send
unsolicited commercial messages is prohibited. Sending mass
electronic messages or "mail-bombing" (sending mass unsolicited mail
or deliberately sending very large attachments to one recipient) is
prohibited. Forging electronic mail headers (addresses) is also
prohibited regardless of commercial content. Use of electronic mail to
harass or intimidate other users is likewise prohibited.
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In the interest of maintaining network performance, users should
not send unreasonably large electronic mail attachments. Users are
prohibited from running programs designed to defeat network
inactivity time-outs.
Illegal Activity
Any activity on the Company's network that is a violation of State
or Federal law is a violation of this policy. Prohibited activities
include, but are not limited to: transmitting obscene materials;
intentionally spreading computer viruses; gaining unauthorized access
to private networks; engaging in the transmission of pirated software;
conducting or participating in illegal gambling; and soliciting for illegal
pyramid schemes through electronic mail or USENET postings.
Questions?
As a member of our network community, we encourage you to
use your Internet access responsibly. Should you have any questions
regarding this policy, feel free to contact us at policy@
HASTnNGS COMM/ENT LJ.
Appendix C:




(1) NSFNET Backbone services are provided to support open
research and education in and among U.S. research and instructional
institutions, plus research arms of for-profit firms when engaged in
open scholarly communication and research. Use for other purposes is
not acceptable.
SPECIFICALLYACCEPTABLE USES:
(2) Communication with foreign researchers and educators
regarding research or instruction, as long as any network that the
foreign user employs for such communication provides reciprocal
access to U.S. researchers and educators.
(3) Communication and exchange for professional development,
to maintain currency, or to debate issues in a field or subfield of
knowledge.
(4) Use for disciplinary-society, university-association,
government-advisory, or standards activities related to the user's
research and instructional activities.
(5) Use in applying for or administering grants or contracts for
research or instruction, but not for other fundraising or public
relations activities.
(6) Any other administrative communications or activities in
direct support of research and instruction.
(7) Announcements of new products or services for use in
research or instruction, but not advertising of any kind.
(8) Any traffic originating from a network of another member
agency of the Federal Networking Council if the traffic meets the
acceptable use policy of that agency.
(9) Communication incidental to otherwise acceptable use,
except for illegal or specifically unacceptable use.
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UNACCEPTABLE USES:
(10) Use for for-profit activities, unless covered by the General
Principle or as a specifically acceptable use.
(11) Extensive use for private or personal business.
This statement applies to use of the the NSFNET Backbone only.
NSF expects that connecting networks will formulate their own use
policies. The NSF Division of Networking and Communications
Research and Infrastructure will resolve any questions about this
Policy or its interpretation.

